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INTRODUCTION
European Convergence
Gerhard Caspert
In the minds of people who have lived through or at least dur-
ing epochal events, such events later tend to become personalized.
Those old enough can vividly remember where they were and what
they were doing when they learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
The personal focus adds life to the past; it confers on us the dig-
nity of having been participants, if not in the making, then at least
in the experiencing of history. These observations will justify, I
hope, a few autobiographical notes at the beginning of this
Introduction.
In September 1989 I participated in the European Regional
Institute on Comparative Constitutionalism, a conference organ-
ized by the American Council of Learned Societies. It took place in
what was then West Berlin. Other participants were primarily con-
stitutional law scholars and political scientists from "Western"
countries. Academics from the German Democratic Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, and the USSR also attended. While the conference
was going on, thousands of East Germans were fleeing through
Hungary to the West and the Hungarian communist government
announced that it would suspend a bilateral agreement with East
Germany under which it was obliged to return to the GDR those
East German citizens who were caught in attempts to migrate.
Hungary justified the suspension by reference to superior interna-
tional law. Invoking "higher law," the Hungarian communists elim-
inated any chance that they might lift the suspension at a later
date. This forced the GDR to limit travel to Hungary, a fellow
t Wiliam B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Provost, The Univer-
sity of Chicago.
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member of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, in the same manner as
it restricted travel to Western countries.
Hungary's action was very much in accord with positions pro-
nounced at the West Berlin conference by a Hungarian professor,
K6lm6m Kulcsdr, who then also served as the communist Minister
of Justice. He had submitted a paper that began as follows: "The
three terms, the most humanistic products of the development of
political thinking and practice: rule of law, constitutionalism, and
human rights, are not accidentally the key words of the current
political reform in Hungary. To wit, the social content of this re-
form is nothing else but the disintegration of an authoritarian-bu-
reaucratic political system so as to be transformed into a pluralis-
tic-democratic one."' Kulcsdr also spoke about the need "to return
to Europe."
Other conference participants from the East represented vari-
ous stages of political development. The elder academic statesmen
from the Soviet Union were ready to admit to Stalinist abuses and
favored some change, but also emphasized that the valuable contri-
butions of Leninism had to be rediscovered and maintained. The
East Germans (from the Institute for Theory of State and Law)
put forward a last-ditch defense of the Wall and government re-
strictions on the right to travel. They seemed most out of tune. In
the wake of the Round Table Talks between Solidarity and the
communists and the formation of the first non-communist govern-
ment in Poland, a Polish participant said that in her country com-
munism was simply a thing of the past.
After the conference ended, I went to East Berlin as I had
done many times over the last three decades to visit my wife's
mother, my brother-in-law (an internist), and his family. I showed
up at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point (not suspecting that it
would be for the last time) and waited for hours, along with other
tourists, to obtain my entry visa. (East Germany required separate
entry and exit visas, the latter issued by the People's Police once
you were in the country.) What I remember most about this cross-
ing was my sense of excitement that in part had been generated by
the conference. I recall saying to Michael Koschel, my brother-in-
law, as we were driving to the suburb where he lives: "Michael, for
the first time I really believe that change is likely." Then I contin-
ued-wondering whether I should actually say something so dar-
' Kfnlmn Kulcsitr, Rule of Law, Constitutionalism, [and] Human Rights in the Trans-
formation of the Hungarian Political System (emphasis in original) (on file with U Chi L
Rev).
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ing-"For all I know, even reunification is not unthinkable any
more." Less than two months later the Wall had fallen, literally
and metaphorically, and less than a year after that, West Berlin
had become western Berlin, and the German Democratic Republic,
eastern Germany. Fifteen months after the West Berlin confer-
ence, Michael Koschel was engaged in the private practice of
medicine in an office suite that formed part of his parental home
and that, since the end of World War II, my mother-in-law had
been forced to lease to "the state" for a state medical practice.
While others in Eastern Europe can tell similar "happy end" sto-
ries, in most instances (even in relatively privileged eastern Ger-
many), Eastern Europeans find it excruciatingly difficult to emerge
from the tangle of political and economic collapse, uncertain prop-
erty rights, and differences of opinion about the best course for the
future.
Kulcsdr referred to the "disintegration" of an "authoritarian-
bureaucratic political system." The disintegration had been long, if
excruciatingly slow, in the making. Ironically, the very steps that
formally stabilized the political map of postwar Europe (the West
German Ostpolitik dating from around 1970 and the Helsinki Ac-
cords of 1975) probably expedited disintegration by facilitating in-
teraction. Toward its end, the process of disintegration seemed to
acquire the very attribute of inevitability that communist writers
since Marx and Engels had associated with the predicted dissolu-
tion of modern capitalism. Gorbachev, of all people, gave expres-
sion to this sense of historic inevitability in, of all places, East Ber-
lin. On October 7, 1989 (three weeks after my conference),
Gorbachev visited East Berlin to celebrate (irony upon irony) the
fortieth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic's exis-
tence. He told Honecker: "Those being late will be punished by life
itself."'2 The punishment of the German communists began within
weeks, that of others followed (who can forget the pictures from
Romania at the end of December 1989?), and Gorbachev himself
may yet become the victim of having come too late.
Economic reporting on Eastern Europe in the postwar period
generally does not deserve Pulitzer Prizes. As I mentioned, family
ties brought me to East Germany on a regular basis throughout my
adult life. When it became possible, we traveled all over the coun-
2 Serge Schnemann, Security Forces Storm Protesters in East Germany, NY Times
Al (Oct 9, 1989). Honecker, said a Soviet spokesman, "expressed 'gratitude' for the informa-
tion." David Marsh, East German Clashes Continue as State Leaders Keep Hard Line, Fin
Times 1 (Oct 9, 1989).
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try, including its industrial heartland. What we saw left no doubt
that the GDR was an economic disaster zone, and yet the most
respectable Western publications were taken in by fake statistics
suggesting that the country exemplified "socialism that works,"
ranking among the leading industrial economies of the world.
Western readers knew more about the dismal state of some other
communist economies, such as Poland's, and yet very few observ-
ers realized the full extent of the bankruptcy.
While it is certainly inappropriate to engage in economic re-
ductionism when trying to understand what happened in Eastern
Europe, one must stress the importance of the economic factor.
The portion of the economic infrastructure that survived World
War II had seen (by comparison with the West) relatively little
renewal and replacement. The stock that had been left was ex-
ploited to the fullest extent; what was added was mostly substan-
dard and staggeringly inefficient. With the fiction of full employ-
ment, worker productivity was, on the whole, low (as the workers'
saying went: "They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work"),
and millions were engaged in completely unproductive activities
such as the surveillance of their fellow citizens. The ystem stag-
gered from crisis to crisis, propped up by the Soviet military and
Soviet energy subsidies, until the USSR itself could no longer af-
ford its empire.
In a manner of speaking, what has happened in Hungary, Po-
land, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Al-
bania partook as much of Chapter 11 reorganization as of political
change. Indeed, the Round Table Talks that preceded the govern-
mental changes in all countries other than Romania and Albania,
and through which the transitions were negotiated, were somewhat
reminiscent of bankrupt management asking creditors for
forbearance.
In all countries other than Hungary and the former GDR, the
awesome tasks of restructuring include the writing of new constitu-
tions. East Germany simply acceded to the Federal Republic's Ba-
sic Law, while Hungary, for the time being, engages in piecemeal
amendments of the existing document. The drafters face all the
usual problems and choices, many of which are detailed in the arti-
cles in this issue. I shall not rehearse them.
I should like to speculate, however, about some features of the
constitutions that will emerge. My thesis is a simple one. On the
whole, Eastern Europe will follow Western European examples.
The Eastern Europeans will find this path pragmatically desirable
because of their aspirations to join the Council of Europe and,
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more importantly, the European Community. They will also find
these models congenial because underlying them is a concept of
the state and its role that goes back all the way to the late eight-
eenth century.3
The new constitutions will not only design what one hopes will
be democratic methods for producing a social order,4 but they
themselves will identify democracy with substantive notions about
the social order. The constitutions will lay down values that are to
guide legislatures. Many aspects of life will be subjected to gov-
erning principles of a programmatic nature and placed under the
overarching care of the state. By comparison with the socialist re-
gimes, pluralism will be constitutionally anchored, and the private
realm will receive constitutional protection, but the state will serve
as the ultimate guarantor of many human aspirations.
This comprehensive ordering approach will create the immedi-
ate problem of sanctifying as constitutional law vague propositions
about the appropriate scope of government. Every social issue will
become a constitutional issue, and law and its oracles will be se-
verely overtaxed. It will also create the potential for constitutional
disappointments on the part of those who will come to believe that
constitutional promises have been breached.
The new constitutions will have comprehensive bills of rights
(even their predecessors had) that will be one of the vehicles for
articulating social values. These bills of rights are likely to leave
details to legislative discretion. Few rights will be truly absolute,
and there will be some duties that will be .viewed as concomitant to
rights. Whether it will be possible under the prevailing economic
and social conditions to guarantee the right to hold private prop-
erty in a meaningful manner is highly dubious.
To the extent that the separation of powers may offer a mea-
sure of institutional protection where the rights approach fails, the
new constitutions are likely to have a weak form of such separa-
tion. An independent executive branch along American lines is
hard to imagine anywhere except as an expression of a preference
for a "strong president," which is nearly the opposite of what
Americans mean when they invoke separation of powers concepts.
The rule will be one form or another of parliamentary democracy,
though there will probably be considerable experimentation paral-
leling the great variety of solutions to be found in Western Europe.
3 See Gerhard Casper, Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism: 18th to 20th Century,
1989 S Ct Rev 311.
' See Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (J.C.B. Mohr, 2d ed 1929).
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Finally, Eastern Europe will follow other European countries
and accept the American "higher law" concept of constitutions.
The new constitutions will institutionalize judicial review, though
likely on the Austrian, German, and Italian model of separate con-
stitutional courts composed differently from ordinary courts and
with their own procedures. The institutionalization of judicial re-
view (already actively implemented in Hungary) will present one
of the greatest challenges in the absence of an independent judi-
ciary and, for all practical purposes, a high-quality legal profession.
The socialist regimes prized neither independent judges nor law-
yers. The legal profession found little social respect, though the
situation was somewhat different in different countries. Under
these conditions, it will be very difficult to create a legal profession
that can avoid the pitfalls of politicization, especially in light of
the legalization of many political questions that, I predict, will
occur.
One of the main dangers ahead is that the organizational is-
sues that in 1989 and afterwards were posed primarily as issues of
practical politics continue to be seen mainly that way. Constitu-
tional politics inevitably are matters of practical politics, but they
also transcend practical politics. Constitutionalism does not refer
simply to having a constitution, but to having a particular kind of
constitution, however difficult it may be to specify its content. The
task is also to assure the stability of the new order-to take the
long view, rather than the short one. This is difficult under the
best of circumstances. It is an awesome challenge under the condi-
tions prevailing in Eastern Europe, where the political sorting-out
after forty-five years of communist dominance must occur at the
same time as the reorganization of bankrupt economies and the
redefinition of national, ethnic, and other cultural identities.
